


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THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

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November 11, 1981

**MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT**  
THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
THE COUNSELLOR TO THE PRESIDENT  
THE DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET  
THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE  
THE UNITED STATES REPRESENTATIVE TO THE UNITED NATIONS  
THE CHIEF OF STAFF TO THE PRESIDENT  
THE DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF TO THE PRESIDENT  
THE CHAIRMAN, THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
THE DIRECTOR, ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY

**SUBJECT: National Security Council Meeting**

The President will chair a meeting of the National Security Council in the Cabinet Room of the White House from 4:00 p.m. to 5:00 p.m. on Thursday, 12 November 1981. The agenda item will be Theater Nuclear Forces Negotiations.

A copy of the agenda paper is attached.

**FOR THE PRESIDENT:**

Richard V. Allen  
Assistant to the President  
for National Security Affairs

**Attachment**

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Review on November 11, 1987

NSC review completed.

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**SECRET/SENSITIVE****NSC Briefing Paper on Theater Nuclear Forces**

The U.S. and the Soviet Union will begin negotiations on theater nuclear forces on November 30 in Geneva. (Henceforth, we intend to call negotiations on theater nuclear forces, negotiations on intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF)). This paper reviews the broad U.S. objectives in these negotiations, provides the agreed elements (Tab A) and sets out options for decision on two remaining key issues to be resolved: how to handle a zero outcome proposal, how to handle shorter-range missiles.

**Basic Objectives**

The basic U.S. objectives in entering these negotiations are:

- To seek an agreement which would significantly reduce Soviet INF levels and thereby enhance Alliance security.
- To maintain political support among Allied governments for deployment of U.S. PERSHING II and ground-launched cruise missiles (GLCMs).
- To demonstrate to European and American publics, that the U.S. is genuinely committed to pursuing meaningful arms control agreements which genuinely enhance security.
- To avoid an agreement that is cosmetic in character, the effect of which would be diminished Alliance security, together with reduced support for INF modernization and Alliance defense efforts in general.

Given the substantial imbalance in U.S. and Soviet theater nuclear forces, the prospects are for long and difficult negotiations and the Soviets will attempt to drive wedges between the U.S. and its Allies. Our approach, therefore, should be designed to withstand the immediate and rising pressures it will come under from Soviet proposals and propaganda and from European desires for early results. Thus, our opening position must be such as to secure European and American public understanding and support and to provide a solid basis from which to pursue negotiations over a sustained period.

**Basic Tactical Considerations**

The basic tactical considerations relevant to these negotiations are:

- To secure the high ground at the outset of negotiations by establishing a position which will put squarely upon the Soviets the burden of responsibility for any future deployments of INF in Europe.

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- To make the most of the likelihood of achieving full Allied support for the U.S. negotiating approach at the opening of negotiations when the Alliance will be most inclined to give the U.S. strong support.
- To ensure that our initial position leaves room for flexibility in later stages of negotiations so we can bargain without having to sacrifice our fundamental objectives.

### Elements of the U.S. Negotiating Position

The Interagency Group over the last six months has developed a solid basis for decision-making on the U.S. approach to these negotiations. The agreed elements are at Tab A. There are two key issues which remain to be resolved and which will permit final preparation of the U.S. negotiating approach.

#### ISSUE ONE: How should the zero level outcome figure in our opening proposal?

There is full interagency agreement that the U.S. should make in the opening round of INF negotiations a proposal for reductions of specified land-based INF missile systems to zero. However, there are two fundamentally different views on how to do this and the choice between them will have profound consequences for the conduct of the negotiations.

Option A: The Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff representative believe that: (a) we should propose reductions to zero at the opening round of negotiations; (b) we should stand on this position for a significant period of time; and (c) we should not indicate during this period a willingness to agree to ceilings above zero.

Option B: State and ACDA believe that the U.S. should propose reductions to the lowest possible equal level with zero as our preferred outcome, but also indicate from the outset a willingness to consider equal ceilings greater than zero.

#### Discussion:

Rationale for Option A: Those supporting Option A, (the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff (rep)) believe that we must table, at the opening round of talks, a clear, simple and dramatic proposal which we would press vigorously over a sustained period in order to gain the potential political and negotiating advantages inherent in a carefully presented zero outcome proposal.

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Our political goal must be to take and hold the high ground by offering a bold initiative that will appeal to the broad public, here and in Europe, on whose support Allied governments depend. It would leave open the possibility for the discussion of ceilings higher than zero in subsequent stages of negotiations.

In our judgment Option B, by offering zero with one hand while simultaneously giving it up with the other, will vitiate the potential impact of zero and truncate our effort to use our zero proposal to build political support in Europe.

The heart of the difference between Option A and Option B is this: with Option A we will propose zero and argue for it as a fair, balanced and equitable proposal that would eliminate long-range INF missiles on both sides. With Option B we will quickly become entangled in a negotiation over how many U.S. missiles will be deployed under an agreement that would leave Soviet missiles in place. The selection of B rather than A would have the following consequences:

- It will repeat the error of the Carter approach to SALT in 1977: proposing two outcomes simultaneously leaving the Soviets to choose the negotiating path it prefers.
- It will elicit a plausible charge from our critics that we were never serious about zero -- that we gave lip service to zero while seeking to pave the way for the deployment of U.S. missiles in Europe.
- It will obscure the fact that Soviet intractability is the cause of the failure to eliminate long-range INF missiles.
- It will leave us with a proposal that lacks clarity and dramatic impact. Far from taking the high ground, we will pull it out from under ourselves and join the Soviets in a mere dispute over numbers.
- It is not an adequate basis for the sort of world-wide political campaign we ought to plan and implement.
- It will open the door to a cosmetic agreement that would not enhance our security.

The selection of Option A rather than Option B would:

- Place the Soviets on the defensive and pave the way for an aggressive world-wide political campaign in behalf of a clear, simple and dramatic U.S. position.
- Take advantage of the Allied solidarity that we can expect early in the negotiations but that is likely to diminish over time.

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- Assure that the Soviets would visibly bear responsibility for any subsequent agreement that entails the retention of their INF missiles and our off-setting deployment.
- Give us sufficient time, with zero on the table, to test its political appeal while leaving open the option to fall back later if circumstances suggest that it is wise to do so.
- Put forward the proposal that comes closest to serving our real security interests.
- Render an agreement easier to verify than an agreement with a ceiling higher than zero.

Rationale for Option B:

Those supporting Option B (The Secretary of State and the Director of ACDA) agree that the U.S. should capitalize on the support in Europe for the total elimination of intermediate-range land-based missiles. They believe we should do so, however, without asserting that the only acceptable arms control agreement on these systems is their total elimination, a position which is likely to prove untenable in the long run, will appear implausible from the start, and is unlikely to be supported by the Allies. They believe that a position which emphasizes reductions to the lowest possible level, to zero if attainable, will be more credible to European governments and publics, and will command strong and durable support.

In the State and ACDA view, selection of Option A could have the following negative consequences:

- We would have to argue that deep reductions in Soviet forces, short of zero, are unacceptable. This is a difficult proposition to defend.
- We would appear unnecessarily rigid to our Allies, and give credence to those who will maintain that the U.S. wants the negotiations to fail.
- The State Department believes that should the U.S. adopt a "zero only" position, the introduction in Europe of the first new U.S. system, due in just 18 months, could be criticized as being inconsistent with our negotiating position. This deployment would remain consistent with an approach which allowed from the outset the possibility of arms control agreements above zero.
- The State Department believes the Soviets are not likely to reject the "zero solution" outright. As a tactical ploy they could counter with a zero approach of their own, confronting us quickly with an impasse over which systems should be included in the zero limitation, and shifting the onus for rejecting zero to the U.S. They have already laid the groundwork for this in recent

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public statements. Many in Europe will support this approach and ridicule ours.

The selection of Option B would:

- Make clear the U.S. preference for total elimination of intermediate-range systems, while also demonstrating a willingness to discuss other equal levels.
- Allow the U.S. to present all of the elements of an equitable and verifiable agreement which we have worked out in consultation with our Allies.
- Maximize Allied support of the U.S. approach, and support for the U.S. Pershing II and GLCM deployments.

Decision:

Option A: Table a draft treaty according to which the Soviets would dismantle all specified missiles and launchers and the U.S. would terminate its deployment of GLCMs and PERSHING II missiles (and dismantle any previously deployed). The U.S. would a) stand on this position for a significant period of time, and b) not indicate during this period a willingness to agree to ceilings above zero.

Option B: The U.S. should propose reductions to the lowest possible equal level with zero as our preferred outcome, but also indicate from the outset a willingness to consider equal ceilings greater than zero. This position could also be embodied in a draft treaty.

Decide for Option A \_\_\_\_\_ Decide for Option B \_\_\_\_\_

ISSUE TWO: How to handle the SS-12/22.

The SS-12/22 is an accurate, mobile ballistic missile with a range of about 925 km. It is agreed among all agencies that any INF agreement would need to address this system.

We have identified two approaches to handle the SS-12/22.

Option A: The Secretary of Defense would include the SS-12/22 among the Soviet systems to be dismantled.

Option B: State, ACDA, and OJCS would treat the SS-12/22 separately from the longer-range missiles by proposing a separate numerical ceiling, or collateral constraints.

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There is agreement in the Interagency Group that the SS-X-23, a 500 km mobile ballistic missile not yet deployed, should be treated separately from the other systems. Further, there is agreement to seek to preclude its deployment.

Discussion:

Rationale for Option A: The Secretary of Defense, who supports Option A (the inclusion of the SS-12/22 among the Soviet forces that would be dismantled under the zero option), believes that we must not leave out of our opening position a weapon that by virtue of its range and capability has the potential, if forward deployed in large numbers, to substitute for the SS-20 for 85% of the high value targets within NATO.

The fact that the SS-12/22 can strike so much of NATO territory when forward deployed is reason enough for its inclusion. But there are several other reasons for including it:

- Inclusion of the 12/22 will dramatize the full scope of the present Soviet advantage in theater nuclear missiles.
- Inclusion of the 12/22 at the opening round of negotiations will provide some bargaining room for subsequent rounds.
- Failure to include the 12/22 will leave us with nothing to give later in the negotiations except increases in the ceiling for SS-20's.
- Defense Department consultations with Allied governments indicate division on this issue with many senior officials in favor of inclusion.
- Separate treatment of the 12/22 will complicate the negotiation and rob the zero proposal of its essential simplicity.
- Opposition among some Europeans to inclusion of the 12/22 is based largely on the judgment that it will prove non-negotiable with the Soviets. Trimming our own position to expedite the negotiations before they even begin means repeating the mistake we made in the SALT talks: we end up negotiating on Soviet terms.

Rationale for B: The Secretary of State, the Director of ACDA, and the OJCS support Option B. They agree that the SS-12/22 should be limited to prevent circumvention of an agreement on long-range missiles. They believe, however, that the U.S. should propose separate numerical limits or collateral constraints on this system.

From the OJCS point of view the SS-12/22 is militarily different than the SS-20 and older SS-4/5. The shorter-range SS-12/22 could cover about the same target base as the SS-20 by deploying forward into Eastern Europe, but forward deployment would increase their vulnerability by bringing them within the range of certain currently deployed NATO weapons.

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Since 1977 the European and American publics have been told that the introduction of the mobile, MIRVed, accurate long-range SS-20 missile has destabilized the nuclear balance in Europe. The United States cannot now successfully argue that Soviet elimination of all their SS-20's, along with the older SS-4's and 5's, is not an acceptable arms control outcome. Nor could we credibly maintain that after elimination of the SS-20's, 4's and 5's, that the U.S. would still have to deploy its new U.S. long-range missiles to Europe unless the Soviets also dismantled the SS-12/22's, a much shorter range system deployed at its current levels since 1975.

Allied governments agree that the SS-12/22 needs to be constrained by any INF agreement, but they have told us that they oppose inclusion of the single warhead, 925 km range SS-12/22 in the same ceiling as the 5000 km range triple warhead SS-20, a step which they feel would undermine the credibility of our approach. They have asked us, instead, to propose separate limits on the SS-12/22 in order to distinguish these missiles clearly from the more capable SS-20. This will focus the negotiations on the longer-range systems, and help to win public support for the U.S. position.

If Option A is chosen:

- The Allies will oppose this aspect of our position.
- We would be in the awkward position of being more concerned about shorter-range systems than our Allies, who are directly threatened by them.
- The Soviets would turn U.S. arguments for including shorter-range systems against us to support their own position on inclusion of U.S. aircraft and sea-based systems, as well as Allied systems.

Decision:

Option A: Include the SS-12/22 in the same aggregate ceiling as the SS-20, SS-4, and SS-5, GLCM and PERSHING.

Option B: Treat the SS-12/22 separately from the longer-range missiles by proposing a separate numerical ceiling, or collateral constraints.

Decide on Option A \_\_\_\_\_

Decide on Option B \_\_\_\_\_

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**Agreed Elements to be Presented Under Zero Option A & B**

**Phased, Comprehensive Approach**

Our basic approach is to pursue arms control on Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces (INF) through a phased, comprehensive approach.

**First Phase: Land-based INF Missiles**

We will propose an agreement in the first phase of negotiations on certain land-based INF missiles only. The limitations we propose for land-based INF missiles would apply worldwide, regardless of location. This principle means that we would not, in the first phase, engage in negotiations on manned aircraft or on missiles or aircraft based on launchers at sea.

**Separate Constraints on the SS-X-23**

The SS-X-23 missile must also be limited in the first phase by means of effective constraints. The SS-X-23 will be treated separately from the longer-range systems. Such constraints could include a ban, a separate numerical ceiling, prohibitions on deployment within certain specified geographic areas, or some combination of the latter two.

**Third Party Systems**

Third party systems will neither be included nor compensated for in any agreement. Exclusion of such systems would prohibit their limitations in any U.S.-Soviet agreement. Non-compensation would entail granting neither the right to a higher ceiling to offset third country systems, nor to maintain a certain number of U.S. or Soviet systems outside the ceiling for this purpose. A special provision may be necessary to prevent circumvention through introduction of new systems into third party full or partial ownership.

**Exclusion of Sea-based Systems**

Sea-based systems will be excluded. Sea-based systems include missiles and aircraft deployed on launchers or launch platforms which are deployed on surface ships or submarines.

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Aircraft Issues\*

We will not negotiate on aircraft issues in the first phase of negotiations. That is, we will not engage in discussions leading to an agreement in the first phase which entails any numerical or geographical limits or restrictions on aircraft or aircraft weapons. We will indicate our willingness in principle to address aircraft issues in subsequent phases. Such an indication in principle would be framed in such a way as not to prejudice how we would address these issues in a second phase. We will, however, be prepared to discuss data on aircraft in the first phase, but only in the context of refuting Soviet claims on the TNF balance which themselves utilize aircraft data.

\*JCS footnote: The JCS believe that as a result of the 13 October 81 NSC meeting, further study is required by the Interagency Group to determine whether it is ever in the US interest to negotiate aircraft issues in TNF. Until that study is completed the United States should adopt a formulation along the lines of the 1979 IDD: "Arms control negotiations involving TNF should be a step-by-step process. The first step should focus on the most immediate threat, with the stringency and scope of limitations sought as ambitious as the Alliance can realistically expect to achieve and verify." Subsequent steps could provide an opportunity to expand the scope of systems covered and to increase the stringency of limitations sought, including reductions."

Special Verification Measures

From the outset we will inform the Soviets, the Allies and the public that national technical means of verification (NTM) alone will not be sufficient to verify an agreement. We will prepare specific verification measures that support our limitation proposals and consider their tactical presentation at a later point. Additionally, JCS feel that we should seek Soviet agreement early in negotiations that verification measures well beyond NTM will be required.

Duration

While retaining tactical flexibility, we will enter these negotiations with the intention of seeking an agreement that is substantial and durable in its own right, without prejudicing its eventual relationship to SALT/START.

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SECRETAdditional Agreed Elements to be Presented Under Zero Option BNumerical Limits on SS-20, SS-4, SS-5, SS-12/22

In the first phase, numerical limits, at a level not greater than 572, must be placed on the SS-20, SS-4, SS-5, and (separately or in an aggregate ceiling) SS-12/22 Soviet missiles.

Unit of Account: Warheads-on-Launchers\*

At any level above zero, the fundamental unit of account will be warheads. In the context of a ban on refire missiles, the unit of account will be warheads-on-launchers, and will define numerical limits. Warheads-on-launchers is understood to be the maximum number of RVs tested per missile, multiplied by the number of missiles per launcher, multiplied by the number of launchers.

The SS-4, SS-5, SS-12, SS-22, SS-X-23, and Pershing II each count as having one warhead-on-launcher for each launcher. The GLCM counts as having four warheads-on-launchers for each GLCM launcher (TEL); the SS-20 counts as having three warheads-on-launcher for each launcher.

Refire Ban'

We will propose a total ban on refire missiles. A refire missile is any missile, assembled or disassembled, which is not deployed on a launcher. A total ban means that no refire missiles would be permitted anywhere in the world. At any level above zero, a limited number of missiles for maintenance spares, research and development, and confidence testing, would be allowed. The issue of missiles for research and development at a zero level has not yet been addressed.

Special Restrictions: Density\*\*

If special geographic restrictions are necessary we will propose restrictions on density, i.e., limits on the maximum number of warheads-on-launchers within a given area irrespective of geographic location.

\* JCS footnote: In the absence of Soviet acceptance of a ban on refires, warheads-on-launchers is inappropriate. The U.S. should adopt warheads-on-missiles as the unit of account until the Soviets agree to a ban on refires.

\*\* See JCS footnote on Unit of Account.

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**SECRET/SENSITIVE****Tab B**

	<b><u>INF Missiles Relevant to an Agreement</u></b>			
	<b><u>#launchers</u></b>	<b><u>#warheads/missile</u></b>	<b><u>refires</u></b>	<b><u>range</u></b>
<b><u>Soviet</u></b>				
SS-20	252	3	yes	5000 km.
SS-4	296	1	yes	1950 km.
SS-5	35	1	yes	4100 km.
SS-12/22	120	1	yes	925 km.
SS-X-23	none yet deployed	1	?	500 km.
<b><u>US*</u></b>				
GLCM	none (464 planned)	1	no	2500 km.
Pershing II	none (108 planned)	1	yes	1800 km.

\*This does not include the 108 Pershing I missiles, range 750 km., which are currently deployed.

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